a rationally calculating individual. Then, tied back (perhaps in the final part of the work of post-colonial, traditional versus post-apartheid South African society.

audiences. The book has particular relevance gy of knowledge, public and global health, theory applications) make it suitable teach-For example, the book could be used as a supknowledge of contemporary sociological

the book, Decoteau paints a dynamic picture

key themes, which connect to global policy, trated throughout. This book about HIV/ such comparative work, in turn, could

The Myth of Liberal Ascendancy: Corporate Dominance from the Great Depression to the Great Recession, by G. William Domhoff. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013. 310 pp. \$28.95 paper. ISBN: 9781612052564.

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A specter is haunting U.S. domestic politics: mid-twentieth century "liberalism." Progressive nostalgia and horrified recollections of the "New Deal" and the "Great Society" reinforce themselves. The Myth of Liberal Ascendancy refutes such Janus-like perspectives and asserts an alternative narrative: increasing corporate dominance since the late 1930s.

The first chapter of G. William Domhoff's book explains how to demonstrate such domination. The next eleven chapters follow a chronological order, but four address specific themes: the origins of the Committee for Economic Development (CED), the exacerbation of industrial relations in the 1960s, and the growing influence of the Business Roundtable. The thirteenth chapter wraps up the general argument, from Reagan's second term to the "Great Recession." Domhoff combines three perspectives. He contrasts the position-taking by the CED on trade and macroeconomic policies, labor laws, and social programs with the positions of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (USCoC) and

the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). The third perspective consists in analyzing the same issues from the standpoints of liberal politicians, union leaders, and activists. To assess which of the three perspectives (the "corporate moderates," the "ultraconservatives," or the "liberal-labor alliance") sees its preferences prevailing, Domhoff draws upon monographs and congressional voting patterns. Consequently, secondary sources constitute the bulk of the rich bibliography of the book, but valuable primary sources also enrich the references.

À la Durkheim, Domhoff uses three "power indicators" to represent the unequal distribution of power between capital and labor in the United States. He interprets the Gini coefficient as a proxy to estimate the output of the class struggle. The effective tax rate for the top one percent reflects the governmental legitimacy to tax and the power of the richest to contain it. The percentage of unionized salary and wage male workers informs us about the capacity of unions to counter the power of the ownership class. "The changes in all three of these power indicators were the result of the corporate community's increasing dominance of government at the expense of the liberal-labor alliance, which was weakened by its inability to incorporate African Americans on an equal basis or make headway in replacing segregationist Southern Democrats with more liberal legislators" (p. 21). In other words, there was no post-war golden age, savaged by the corporate mobilization of the 1970s and by the triumph of the New Right with the Republican three-peat of the 1980s.

Domhoff does not negate postwar "prosperity." Economic growth and declining income inequality were the political-economic aftermath of wars: first and foremost the Second World War, but also the Cold War with the reconstructions of Western Europe and Japan, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. They pumped up domestic production and forced the U.S. government to contain bosses' anti-unionism, modulo the purges of radical unionists and "right-towork" regulations. Until the Vietnam fiasco, warfare had also given the government the legitimacy to increase taxation and to expand its macro-economic role and the

benefits provided to subsets of the citizenry (the elderly, veterans, the poor).

Domhoff does not deny the rightward inflection of the 1970s. But political mobilization among corporate leaders had predated this shift, and class and race struggles in the 1960s altered the power structure. Southern Democrats and some white blue- and white-collar workers in the North shifted their political allegiance because they opposed desegregation. "Corporate moderates" reacted to the National Labor Relations Board giving unions more leeway by realigning with the "ultra-conservatives." While the "liberal-labor alliance" was undermined by racism and divisions, business representatives reunited to defend their capitalist prerogatives. Moreover, increased energy prices and foreign competition refocused their grievances to pressing issues: public spending and labor costs.

The Myth of Liberal Ascendancy is about power. At the legislative stage, liberal-labor achievements were paid for dearly. They had long preserved racially-based exploitation in the South and the compromises had to favor the "spending coalition." This amalgam of Southern Democrats, local executives, real-estate promoters, and machine politicians watered down the measures to be implemented or diverted the objectives of the laws to oppose unionization, defy integration, and consolidate their clientele. Through foundations and think tanks, "corporate moderates" promoted health, unemployment, and retirement benefits, as well as private initiatives to ameliorate conditions in the inner city. Favoring fiscal stimulus, they agreed on raising taxes in critical times. On the contrary, there were issues "corporate moderates" never compromised on: the participation of unions in the management of firms; the deployment of a comprehensive welfare state similar to those in Europe; the commitment of the federal government to full employment through public planning, investments, companies, and services. In reading this book, there appear to be two prerequisites for corporate leaders to consider ameliorative measures. The state of the economy or social unrest must force corporate leaders to engage with a strong organized labor movement, backed by a government not too dependent on business

interests. And corporate executives and their representatives must remain confident in the perpetuation of their grip on the economy; otherwise they will align with their hardline

The distinction between "moderate corporates" and "ultraconservatives" relies less on ideological divides than on the division of the labor of domination. The USCoC and NAM mainly focused on the power of management over the plants, divisions, and firms their affiliates ran. More often at the very top of the largest companies, members of the CED aimed for ascendancy of the ownership class over the national power structure. What The Myth of Liberal Ascendancy documents is therefore a theory of class domination, despite the author's denial in the preface. The three pillars of this class domination are (1) the control of the means of production, (2) the ability to promote policies through the policy-planning network and get them enacted by the two main parties, and (3) the social cohesion of the ownership class. While the first two pillars seem stronger than ever, some have argued that social cohesion among owners and high-level executives of the largest corporations has decreased over the past three decades. In The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite (2013), Mark Mizruchi documents the corporate elite's Pyrrhic victory against organized labor and the federal government as well as the breakdown of interlocking directorates. Their dense structure around commercial banks helped them function as an effective mode of coordination among corporate leaders. According to Mizruchi, prominence without efficacy defines their current situation. Yet, they thrive, they occupy positions of power, and they rarely lose the political battles in which they engage.

To what extent is Domhoff's argument falsifiable? Is it irrefutable that corporate domination characterizes capitalist societies? The Myth of Liberal Ascendancy documents what it took to shake the American power structure in the twentieth century (the succession of a great depression and a world war), and how long it took (four decades) for the ownership class to recover. Moreover, Domhoff delineates the rare conditions for and the strict limits of ameliorative policy from the "corporate moderates": the combined

pressure from an autonomous government providing a combative organized labor with institutional supports; and no jeopardy to the "right to manage." Eventually, this book accounts for exceptions to corporate dominance and their quid pro quo: horsetrading on proposals drafted by experts from organizations funded by philanthropists and large corporations, concessions to the segregationist Southern Democrats, and devolutions to machine politicians.

Reference

Mizruchi, Mark. 2013. The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Linda Liska Belgrave

experience gained by spending many weeks Research Unit. This book is well-written importance of prevention, the Doyals focus